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as this distinction does not become a forced binary, which Moser protects 
against, then its significance within contemporary philosophy cannot be 
understated.
Instead of dismissing Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism wholesale, as 
several analytic and Christian philosophers do, Moser gives us a way to 
charitably engage with Rorty’s proposal for philosophy to be reduced to 
“conversation.” On Moser’s terms, Rorty’s pragmatism ironically does not 
put enough emphasis on the requirement for action. Rorty emphasizes 
only talk. Furthermore, although he is a self-described pluralist, he does 
not allow for a mode of obedience as a legitimate way to “talk” philosophy. 
Another point of healthy contention concerns Hilary Putnam’s linguistic-
centered, Wittgensteinian pragmatism that remains friendly toward both 
realism and theism. It focuses on talk, more than action, but does not po-
lice out a mode of obedience within philosophy—especially, his most recent 
publication, Jewish Philosophy as a Way of Life (Putnam’s chapter on Martin 
Buber’s “I-Thou” theology is all about how contemporary philosophy 
might work in a mode of obedience). Lastly, Jürgen Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action provides a way to understand the significance of 
Moser’s proposal. We could defend Habermas’s theory, on Moser’s terms, 
in that it includes both action and talk. However, Habermas’s philosophy 
certainly does not turn this action and talk into a mode of obedience. In sum-
mary: I find Moser’s last two steps in his comprehensive development of 
what a “Christ-shaped” philosophy looks like quite helpful for navigating 
the work of some of the major philosophical thinkers in our time.
Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization, by Charles C. Camosy. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. viii + 278 pages. $30.99.
BRYAN PILKINGTON, Aquinas College
Camosy argues that disagreement between Singer and Christians is nar-
row, and that both “can work together on many important issues of ethics 
and public policy” (7). Before discussing their respective ethical theories, 
and a possible “shift” in Singer’s thought, Camosy compares how these 
seemingly contrasting “traditions” view four practical topics: abortion, 
euthanasia, non-human animals, and duties to the poor. As an attempt to 
place different approaches to practical moral issues “in contact” with each 
other, the book succeeds. However, the arguments of the book fall short of 
bringing Singer and Christians together in any more robust sense.
Camosy offers fine surveys of the relevant literatures on the aforemen-
tioned practical topics from both Singer’s work and the work of Christian 
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thinkers. His text is written in a clear and easily understandable style. The 
chapters on abortion and euthanasia nicely capture much of the relevant 
work within medical ethics. The chapter on non-human animals similarly 
captures many of the relevant points of discussion on the distinction be-
tween human and non-human animals found in environmental philoso-
phy. These surveys and Camosy’s writing style are strengths of the book, 
though someone familiar with bioethics or environmental philosophy 
will not find that much new insight is offered. Similarly, the chapter on 
duties to the poor is interesting and articulated well, but those familiar 
with Singer’s work and with Catholic Social Teaching will be not find a 
great deal of new work here.
The absence of much new work within these traditions need not be 
viewed as a weakness, as the aim of the book is to bring together two tradi-
tions and to illustrate that their disagreements are narrow enough that their 
supporters can agree on issues of ethics and public policy. It is not surpris-
ing, however, that careful philosophical work, even if it approaches issues 
differently, elicits some similar practical conclusions. And it is no accident 
that Camosy deals with practical issues before turning to theory. A reader 
might worry that the respective ethical theories are articulated with the 
goal of reconciliation already in mind. Representative points of comparison 
include agreement on the consequents of many conditional claims (e.g., if a 
fetus is a person, then . . . ) and agreement between teleology and utilitarian-
ism, as both are concerned with consequences. But surely agreement on the 
antecedent of such a conditional is important, as is the difference between 
considering the consequences among other things and considering only the 
consequences in evaluating an action. Consider each in turn.
The argument for the narrowness of disagreement between Singer and 
Christians on abortion, to consider one of the practical issues taken up 
by Camosy, appears to rely on the claim that there are many similarities 
between them and only one real difference. Camosy claims that both reject 
“privacy centered moral neutrality,” “agree that the Roe v. Wade approach 
to abortion is a mistake,” and “see a logical connection between one’s view 
of abortion and one’s view of infanticide” (39). Further, both agree that the 
negative effects of outlawing abortion do not justify the killing of a fetus 
and, in fact, that there are duties to not kill (and even to support) a fetus. 
But this further agreement is dependent upon an assumption that the 
fetus is a person. I am wary about describing this disagreement as narrow 
in virtue of the aforementioned points of agreement, but even granting its 
narrowness, it has not been shown that the disagreement is not significant. 
Significant but narrow disagreement is consistent with serious and deep 
disagreement, as it is in this case. For many philosophers and theologians, 
questions of moral status and personhood are paramount, so claiming 
that if Singer and Christians agreed about the status of a fetus, then they 
would offer similar answers to a number of other questions should not 
lead us to the conclusion that their disagreement is not deep (even if nar-
row). Further, this manner of considering the disagreement is not new. 
Faith and Philosophy480
There are a number of medical ethicists who would change their view if 
their assessment of the moral status of a fetus changed.1
A second worry a reader might have about the account of disagreement 
offered by Camosy involves the classification of ethical theories. Utilitiarian 
theories are said to be a subset of teleological theories, which are a subset 
of consequentialist theories. Camosy appropriately anticipates confusion 
and so is careful to define consequentialist theories as those “which locate a 
primary moral concern in the consequences of one’s actions” (182). Theories 
are teleological if they are “concerned with achieving an end” and utilitar-
ian if that end is “the end of maximizing utility” (182). His taxonomy differs 
from the usual classification of ethical theories and this might be due to his 
use of the indefinite article prior to primary in defining consequentialism. 
Consequentialist theories are often thought of as having a single primary 
concern, whereas a teleological theory (e.g., Aristotle’s account of eudai-
monia) takes into account consequences but not only consequences. I do not 
wish to quibble with definitions here, but merely to point out that how we 
classify theories might affect our understanding of their similarity.
My worries with the arguments offered in this book require two quali-
fications. First, if Singer’s view shifts significantly in the future, as Camosy 
suggests it might, then the disagreement between Singer and Christians 
might become insignificant. Second, Camosy’s claim that Christians might 
learn from Singer because he is consistent is instructive. This suggests that 
the intended audience is not academic philosophers who already strive 
for consistency and take Singer’s work seriously, even if we disagree, but 
a group hostile to Singer, who the author believes lack a basic virtue of 
philosophical thought. If one is interested in reconciliationist ethics, the 
book will prove worthwhile. If one has taken Singer and consistency seri-
ously, the book may be of less interest.
1Consider, for example, Mary Anne Warren’s now famous article “On the Moral and Legal Status 
of Abortion,” Monist 57 (1973), 43–61. 
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God and the Multiverse: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Perspectives, 
edited by Klaas J. Kraay. New York: Routledge, 2014. 248 pages. $140.00 
(hardback).
KIRK LOUGHEED, Monash University
This edited volume by Klaas J. Kraay brings together twelve contributions 
which explore different philosophical, theological, and scientific issues 
surrounding the multiverse. The book is helpfully divided into five main 
sections.
